



درباره امکان توهم

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Abstract: Hallucinations are often characterized as experiences that present non-existent objects. Many argue that the possibility of hallucinations implies that perceptual experiences are not constituted by direct relations to ordinary objects. Disjunctivists typically resist this argument by denying that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. In this paper, I propose a new strategy that involves rejecting the assumption, shared between disjunctivists and their opponents, that hallucinations are possible. To this effect, I examine four ways to explain away the alleged evidence for the possibility of hallucinations and argue that they are jointly sufficient to support a skeptical attitude toward the possibility of hallucinations.

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