



Rigidity, Scope, and Apparently Empty Names

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Abstract:

The third appendix of Michael Dummett's *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy* is devoted to a reply to Kripke's criticism (in the introduction of *Naming and Necessity*) of Dummett's earlier criticism of the theory of direct reference of proper names. The debate has recently been revived for various reasons, including the behavior of apparently empty names in modal contexts. Dummett defends widescopism, according to which the concept of rigidity can be cashed out in terms of Russell's concept of wide scope. Scott Soames rejects Dummett's analysis of rigidity in favor of a Millian account. David Sosa argues against Scott Soames. In this talk, I will be reviewing this debate: in particular I will try to provide a clear formulation of the Millian argument against Dummett's widescopism and argue that the Millian argument against widescopism does not provide a reason against widescopism in favor of Millianism.

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