Not So Fast; An Avicennian Defense of Necessitarianism

هاشم مروارید

دانشگاه جانز هاپکینز

چکیده

Necessitarianism—the view that every true proposition is necessarily true—has fallen out of fashion, largely due to rational, non-inferential reflections on the modal status of actual states of affairs. Such reflections often lead philosophers to conclude that the actual world could have been otherwise. In this talk, I argue that these reflections do not constitute reliable evidence against necessitarianism. Drawing on Avicenna's modal theory, I distinguish between two types of necessity: in itself and through another, a distinction that gives rise to two forms of necessitarianism: (1) strong necessitarianism, which holds that every true proposition is necessary in itself, and (2) weak necessitarianism, which holds that every true proposition is either necessary in itself or necessary through another. I then show that while rational non-inferential reflections may be reliable evidence against strong necessitarianism, they are not reliable evidence against weak necessitarianism. To support this claim, I examine three major accounts of rational non-inferential modal reflection—Bealer's intuition account, Yablo's conceivability account, and Chalmers' conceivability account—and demonstrate that, on none of these accounts, can weak necessitarianism be dismissed solely by armchair, non-referential reflection; rather, it requires substantive argument to be refuted.

شرکت برای عموم آزاد است.

زمان: دوشنبه، ۲۹ اردیبهشت ۱۴۰۴، ساعت ۱۶:۳۰ تا ۱۸:۰۰

برگزاری **صرفاً** به صورت مجازی در لینک

https://meet.google.com/szz-ogik-tyn