



Know-how-first Anti-intellectualism

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Abstract

In order to explain the nature of know-how, philosophers are divided into two camps. Intellectualists take know-how to be a species of knowledge-that (Stanley & Williamson 2001). By contrast, anti-intellectualists insist on its non-propositional nature. Instead, they propose to think of knowing how to do F as a matter of ability to do that (Ryle 1949). Inspired by Williamson's knowledge-first epistemology, I propose a version of anti-intellectualism that can be called the 'know-how-first view'. The core idea is that the kind of ability which is relevant to know-how cannot be defined or explained without appealing to know-how itself. I argue for this new account by discussing some classic challenges for anti-intellectualism.

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