



# تبیین دیویدسن از معرفت اول شخص و نقد رایت بر آن

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## Abstract:

The problem of self-knowledge concerns explaining the fact that we know ourselves directly and non-inferentially, while others' knowledge of our attitudes is indirect and inferential. Davidson attempts to explain this "asymmetry" in knowledge by arguing that the asymmetry must exist if interpretation is to be possible at all. Let's call this argument Davidson's "Transcendental Argument". Many commentators on Davidson's account, including Crispin Wright, however, has taken Davidson to be offering a different sort of account, according to which the asymmetry is explained in terms of the fact that speakers' ascriptions of meaning to themselves (self-ascriptions) are bound to be only disquotationally specifiable, as the consequence of which it is guaranteed that they directly know what they mean by their utterances, while others' ascriptions of meaning to the speakers are not necessarily best specifiable disquotationally, and hence there is no guarantee that they are always right about what the speakers mean and believe. Let's call this the "Disquotational Argument". In this talk, I will discuss these two readings of Davidson's account and will argue that the Disquotational Argument is not Davidson's actual account of self-knowledge: he seems to have already rejected such explanations. Finally, I will discuss whether the Disquotational Argument, as an explanation of self-knowledge, is generally defensible.

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