



اراده کردن، قصد کردن، و فراباز نمودن: روانشناسانه کردن ضعف اراده

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Abstract:

Philosophers have always seen weakness of will as acting against one's better judgment. But more recently Holton has suggested that weakness of will is agent's failure to persist in resolutions. However, precisely what resolutions are and what forming resolutions cognitively involves are left rather underdescribed in Holton's account. I first briefly clarify the concept of resolution and show that having a resolution involves the capacity of metarepresentation and intention recognition. This will provide a framework for a more natural and empirically oriented account of weakness of will. To that end, I present substantial evidence from developmental psychology which, I argue, demonstrates that weakness or strength of will is essentially an exercise in metarepresentation.

زمان: دوشنبه، ۸ آبان ۱۳۹۶، ساعت ۱۶ الی ۱۸

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