



داشتن دلایل هنجاری

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Abstract

The standard, purely epistemic, accounts of reason possession have it that possessing a fact as a normative reason consists of nothing more than having epistemic access to that fact. I begin the talk by arguing that pure epistemic accounts of possessing normative reasons are untenable, since they fail to account for the role of reasoning abilities in discovering and responding to normative reasons. Possessing a normative reason, I submit, requires that one has the general and specific abilities to respond to that reason, while these abilities are analyzed in terms of dispositions to successfully respond to reasons when one tries to do so. By way of defense and further elaboration, I will examine and respond to a series of purported counter-examples to this ability-based account of possessing normative reasons.

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