



# گیارد: معنا و هنجاریت

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Abstract: In his recent book *Meaning and Normativity* (2012), Allan Gibbard argues in favor of a "straight solution" for Kripke's skeptical argument. Drawing a distinction between the "property of meaning" and "concept of meaning", Gibbard suggests that meaning-determining facts consist in dispositional properties, and the alleged normative feature of meaning is a matter of the concept of meaning. In this presentation I will argue against Gibbard's solution. I will argue that Gibbard's dispositional account falls prey for the same problem that the standard dispositional account does. Also, it will be argued that Gibbard's treatment of the normativity fails to capture the "constitutive" nature of the skeptical argument.

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