



انواع دیدگاه‌های راسلی

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Abstract: Russellianism is the relatively popular view that the meaning of a proper name is the individual designated by the name. Together with other plausible assumptions, Russellianism entails the following doctrine: Sentences containing proper names express Russellian propositions, which involve the individual designated by the name as a direct constituent, and which can be represented as sets of individuals and properties. Moreover, as they occur in ordinary belief reports, 'that'-clauses designate Russellian propositions. Such belief reports are true if and only if the subject of the belief report bears the belief relation to the proposition designated by the 'that'-clause. In defending this doctrine, some Russellians appeal to *propositional guises*, which, roughly speaking, are *ways of grasping propositions* (see, for example, Nathan Salmon's influential *Frege's Puzzle*). However, some Russellians don't appeal to such entities (see, for example, Jonathan Berg's recent *Direct Belief*). In this paper, I explain the varieties of Russellianism and then argue for Modest Russellianism: Believing a Russellian proposition is essentially mediated by guises, so that an agent can't believe a Russellian proposition without standing in some appropriate relation to both the proposition and a guise. Nonetheless, guises don't feature in the semantics of ordinary belief reports, so that an adequate account of the meaning of such belief reports needn't invoke guises.

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