



# تصورپذیری، امکان و اشتباه در تشخیص

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## Abstract:

Historically, the main view of how we can gain modal knowledge is that there is a connection between modal facts (possibility and necessity) and some sort of our mental activity (conceiving, imagining...). The claim is that whenever we can 'conceive' of a proposition's being true we are justified in believing that it is possible (call this the CT: Conceivability Thesis).

One source of counterexamples to CT (that might threaten the reliability of CT) is necessary a posteriori propositions. It seems that we can conceive situations in which these propositions are false. Kripke tries to explain away this appearance of possibility by arguing that there is a situation, epistemically identical to that we try to conceive and we conflate these two situations. I endeavor to show that we really imagine situations in which necessary a posteriori propositions are false and therefore, that Kripke's explanation is unintuitive.

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