



# قصد و تبیین‌های مبتنی بر قضاوت

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## Abstract:

According to Wright's Judgement-Dependent account of intention, facts about a subject's intentions are viewed as constituted by the subject's best opinions, or judgements, about them formed under certain optimal conditions. If such conditions hold, the subject has an intention if and only if she judges that she has that intention. Boghossian, however, has objected that this account faces a problem: How can the content of such fact-constituting judgements get determined? Wright's account, thus, has to deal with a dilemma: either it would be trapped in a vicious regress of appealing to higher-order judgements or it should treat such a content-determining process as a mysterious process. In order to respond to Boghossian, Wright invites a Davidsonian Interpretationist Proposal, according to which the content of the subject's judgements gets fixed by the judgements of an interpreter. In this talk, I will argue that Wright's manoeuvre is hopeless as it either fails to resist Boghossian's objection or results in a collapse in the account as a First-Person-Based Judgement-Dependent account of intention.

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