



# I Know What You Mean, Though, Not By Simulation

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## Abstract:

There is a general consensus among theorists that communication, conceived of in a Gricean manner, involves metarepresentation, expression and recognition of intentions. One widely held position in accounting for the way we recognize intentions (and other mental states) is the simulation theory. The question then arises as to how might simulation, as an account of mental state attribution/recognition, explain the mindreading exhibited in pragmatic interpretation? I will distinguish between two senses of “direct” and “indirect” simulation, then briefly argue that simulation in each sense, when applied to utterance interpretation, turns either cognitively too demanding or virtually ineffective in communication.

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