



ادراک و اندیشه‌های مفرد

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Abstract:

I assume that the reference of perceptual demonstrative thoughts, such as *that tree is green*, is fixed by our perception of the relevant object (the tree). The main question of the talk is how perception can undergird such a demonstrative reference, and in particular, what repercussions it has for the metaphysical nature of perception. I will argue that (1) perception fixes the demonstrative reference in a non-satisfactional way, that is, NOT through the unique satisfaction of conditions, such as properties, roles, and the like, and (2) if perception is not taken to be constitutively object-involving, then it will not be able to serve a non-satisfactional reference-fixing role. From (1) and (2), I conclude that perception is constitutively object-involving. I will close the talk with brief illuminations on this conclusion and a sketchy reference to the broader project in which this talk is situated.

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