



سادگی و محافظه‌گرایی معرفتی

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Abstract: Various theses have been proposed and defended under the name of epistemic conservatism. Interestingly, even its proponents often take epistemic conservatism to be a principle that is not applicable in a wide range of cases and/or does not have a particularly strong force. However, scientific practice seems to give relatively high value to conservatism in at least two ways: i) scientists accept confirming evidence at face value while harshly scrutinizing disconfirming evidence; ii) they prefer theories that are less damaging to their current body of theories when accommodating disconfirming evidence. I shall try to make sense of the seeming tension between the literature on epistemic conservatism and the scientific practice. I will argue that considerations of simplicity and precision provide good explanations for the conservative practice of science. Therefore, scientific enterprise does not give us reason for adding epistemic conservatism as an independent canon of rationality.

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