



مسائل نیوکام مسئله تصمیم هستند: نقدی بر استدلال جفری

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Abstract: What is the rational choice? This question can be posed regarding any choice situation. Non-causalism is the doctrine that an adequate answer to this question might be provided without taking causal information into account. To argue for non-causalism, its proponents need to propose an adequate theory of rational choice that does not resort to causal information. Framing the debate about non-causalism within the framework of decision theory and reviewing various species of Newcomb problems, which are presented as counterexamples to the best brand of non-causal rational choice theory, i.e., Richard Jeffrey's evidential decision theory, I will review and criticize Jeffrey's last response to the challenge that Newcomb problems pose to evidential decision theories.

In his recent works, Jeffrey argues that Newcomb problems are not decision problems. I argue that the key assumptions of Jeffrey's argument are not true and cannot be amended in such a way that can be deployed in an argument against Newcomb problems.

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