



دربارهٔ منزلت معرفتی مفهوم استحقاق در نظریهٔ رایت

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Abstract: Crispin Wright has claimed that what makes one's perceptual experience confer justification on the beliefs it gives rise to includes having independent warrant to believe certain kind of presuppositions or cornerstones. He claims that we have some sort of default, non-evidential, but still epistemic warrant (entitlement), to accept those cornerstones. Many philosophers, however, think that Wright's arguments at most show that entitlement has a pragmatic character. In his most recent writings, Wright dismisses this charge. I shall argue that Wright's response is inadequate. However, instead of concluding, with the skeptic, that cornerstones beliefs lack justification, I shall try to show that the kind of considerations that Wright adduces in support of his claim can nevertheless be relevant to their epistemic status, though not in the way envisaged by him. To do this, I shall develop a thesis of epistemic encroachment according to which the epistemic stakes of a belief are relevant to its epistemic status as are its practical stakes. The consequences of this claim will then be explored for the question of the epistemic status of cornerstone beliefs which seem to show that, pace Wright, such beliefs can, after all, be evidentially warranted. It will be concluded that such a gloss on Wright's arguments for the entitlement thesis can free his conservative account of many problems that are widely believed to plague it.

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